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In 1973, Dr. Landrum Shettles of Columbia-Presbyterian Hospital in New York City 
agreed to assist a couple who had struggled for years to conceive a child.  John and Doris Del-
Zio came to Dr. Shettles, a recognized expert in the emerging field of in vitro fertilization, in 
order to attempt this final experimental procedure in the hopes of overcoming infertility and 
having a child.  Shettles started working with the Del-Zios and even fertilized Doris Del-Zio’s 
egg in the laboratory, however, the hospital administration learned of Shettles’s research and 
halted the experiment before the fertilized egg could be re-implanted. 
By terminating Dr. Shettles’s research, the hospital administration impeded scientific 
progress in aiding infertile couples.  Moreover, the discontinuation of the procedure personally 
devastated the Del-Zios who became emotionally connected with the possibility of experiencing 
parenthood.  As a result, the Del-Zios filed a lawsuit against Columbia Presbyterian Hospital.  In 
their lawsuit, the Del-Zios alleged that the hospital’s termination of the procedure provided the 
basis for legal action under a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
 The Del Zio’s case illustrates the complex and difficult issues associated with advances 
in biomedical research and emerging medical technology.  The difficulty connected with 
understanding and addressing the issues and dilemmas presented by the rapid advance of 
biomedical technology has facilitated the creation of an innovative field of scholarly inquiry - 
bioethics.  One of the most complex issues discussed today in the bioethics field is the regulation 
of human reproduction and fertility.  In many ways, fertility treatment is located just beyond the 
“water’s edge,” beyond the boundaries of legal directive.  It is at the frontier of human 
knowledge, medical science, moral understanding, and the law. 
Curiously, historians have largely focused on one piece of the human reproduction 
equation – preventing or terminating pregnancy through either contraception or abortion.  Under 
a related analytical framework, historians have also explored the issue of eugenics.  However, 
little work has been completed on efforts to facilitate procreation and the arrival of fertility 
treatment, which has advanced rapidly since the 1970s.  This represents a large gap in the 
historical literature.   Moreover, it is essential that scholars research and understand how society 
has responded to the continuously developing field of assisted reproduction, because it allows for 
a more accurate representation of rights associated with procreation.  Even Roe v. Wade, a 
landmark case supporting a woman’s right to choose to terminate her pregnancy, has important 
implications and connections with facilitating pregnancy.  The Supreme Court’s rationale has 
been cited in support of expanding the right of privacy to protecting the right to procreate. 
Currently, much of the scholarly debate surrounding advances in biomedical technology 
has centered on the value of applying legal solutions.  However, instead of discussing whether 
the law should be employed to regulate biomedical advance or fertility treatment, it is more 
informative to analyze the choice of substantive law.  Substantive law creates the legal rules that 
direct the relationship between individuals in society or between individuals and the state.  
Substantive law contains a number of varied and diverse bodies of law: including contract, tort, 
administrative law, criminal law, and constitutional law.  Some bodies of law sweep more 
broadly than others.  In other words, choosing particular areas of law to apply to any given issue 
impacts the reach of the court’s decision.  The most extreme solution, with the greatest reach and 
greatest impact, is the application of constitutional law. 
Public law is a term often used to describe laws and regulations that control the 
connection between individuals and the state.  Public law includes several different categories of 
law.  These categories include criminal law, administrative law and constitutional law.  Cases 
speaking directly to constitutional principles are sweeping mandates, directing the choice of 
public law to resolve contentious issues like abortion.  Criminal law offers another important 
area of substantive law.  One of the most effective ways to stop, or at least deter, behavior is to 
make it criminal.  Legislatures and Congress assign criminal punishment to acts that bear moral 
culpability; statutes reflect the moral values of the society that elects the legislative body.  Public 
law represents an important facet of substantive law, but it is only part of the overall landscape.  
Alternatively, some bioethics issues have been dealt with through private law.  Generally, 
private law does not involve the state.  Two primary examples of private law are the law of 
contracts and the law of torts.  Contract law involves a legally enforceable agreement between 
two or more parties.  Under a contract, the parties have exchanged promises creating a legally 
enforceable agreement whereby a court may offer a remedy to an aggrieved party if a breach 
occurs.  An individual commits a tort when they commit a wrong that breaches a duty owed to 
another individual.  Courts may rectify these wrongs by awarding damages to the harmed 
individual.  Private law often proceeds on the notion that case decisions reflect the values of a 
community and allow for incremental change desired by community members.  Private law 
assumes individual autonomy and the need for a case-by-case analysis.  
Unsurprisingly, people often look to the judicial system to resolve contentious issues, and 
this is true of bioethics and biomedical technology.  Generally, some of the most recognizable 
substantive law rules concerning bioethical issues come from Supreme Court decisions applying 
constitutional law, such as Roe v. Wade, Griswold v. Connecticut, and Cruzan v. Director.1  
These cases demonstrate the tension between different parties, organizations, and ideas inherent 
in the resolution of cases concerning advances in biomedical technology.  In addition, the 
competing interests present in the study of bioethics and biomedical advance illustrate the 
tension among doctors, lawyers, and academics, but also illuminate the difference between 
public and private law. 
Always hanging over the contentious issues of bioethics is the divisive decision in Roe v. 
Wade.2  In January 1973, the United States Supreme Court decided this landmark abortion case. 
Politicization of bioethical issues is likely inevitable.  In recognition of the increasing importance 
of bioethics, Congress created the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of 
Biomedical and Behavioral Research in 1974, one year after the Roe decision.  This body was 
part of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (now Health and Human Services), 
and remained in existence until 1978.  With the exception of two lapses, from 1983-1988 and 
from 1990-1994, there has been a body in existence that has been responsible for promoting and 
conducting research, analyzing information, and issuing proposed reports, and sometimes, policy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  In	  Griswold	  v.	  Connecticut	  (1965)	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  examined	  the	  use	  of	  contraceptive	  devices	  by	  married	  couples.	  	  The	  Court	  concluded	  that	  a	  state	  may	  not	  criminalize	  the	  use	  of	  contraceptives	  by	  married	  couples.	  	  The	  Constitution	  affords	  couples	  protection	  under	  the	  marital	  right	  to	  privacy	  found	  in	  the	  penumbra	  of	  rights	  emanating	  from	  multiple	  provisions	  of	  the	  Constitution	  and	  the	  Bill	  of	  Rights.	  Roe	  v.	  Wade	  (1973)	  is	  a	  Supreme	  Court	  decision	  concerning	  a	  woman’s	  decision	  to	  have	  an	  abortion.	  	  Roe	  v.	  Wade	  extends	  the	  constitutionally	  protected	  right	  to	  privacy	  to	  include	  a	  woman’s	  choice	  to	  terminate	  her	  pregnancy	  during	  the	  first	  trimester.	  	  During	  the	  second	  trimester,	  the	  state	  may	  regulate	  abortion	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  is	  “reasonably	  related	  to	  maternal	  health.”	  	  Finally,	  during	  the	  third	  trimester	  the	  state	  has	  a	  legitimate	  interest	  in	  the	  potential	  life	  of	  the	  fetus	  and	  may	  regulate	  and	  even	  proscribe	  abortion.	  	  In	  Cruzan	  v.	  Director	  (1990)	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  examined	  the	  issue	  of	  removing	  a	  patient	  from	  life	  sustaining	  treatment.	  	  The	  Court	  found	  that	  in	  order	  to	  terminate	  the	  life	  support	  of	  an	  individual	  in	  a	  persistent	  vegetative	  state,	  there	  must	  be	  a	  showing	  of	  clear	  and	  convincing	  evidence	  demonstrating	  the	  wishes	  of	  the	  patient	  to	  be	  removed	  from	  life	  support.	  2	  David	  J.	  Rothman,	  Strangers	  at	  the	  Bedside:	  A	  History	  of	  How	  Law	  and	  Bioethics	  	  
Transformed	  Medical	  Decision	  Making	  (New	  York:	  HarperCollins,	  1991);	  Ben	  Rich,	  Strange	  
Bedfellow:	  How	  Medical	  Jurisprudence	  Has	  Influenced	  Medical	  Ethics	  and	  Medical	  Practice	  (New	  York:	  Kluwer	  Academic/Plenum	  Publishers,	  2001).	  
advice following the creation of the National Commission in 1974.  However these presidential 
bioethics commissions are notable for the diversity of names, objectives, and at times, political 
stalemate over divisive issues such as abortion, use of certain groups as study subjects, or stem 
cell research.  
 Issues of bioethics live under the shadow of the Roe decision, yet scholars tend to treat 
abortion, surrogacy, and in-vitro fertilization as loosely, if at all, related issues.  Instead, scholars 
must distance themselves from the Roe decision, not because it is not important, but rather 
because focusing so heavily on the decision has made it exceptional.  The Roe decision was 
significant, but by no means unique.  This decision must be analyzed in context of others during 
the modern period, specifically other issues relating to bioethics, such as Buck v. Bell, Skinner v. 
Oklahoma, and Cruzan v. Director.  Importantly, the commission offers an opportunity for 
scholars to examine how political debate has influenced questions of biomedical advance, and 
more directly, issues stemming from ART. 
The present body of scholarship reflects a variety of methodological and disciplinary 
approaches.  Case law opinions reflect unsettled principles concerning many bioethics issues at 
the common law level.  The unsurprising reality at the governmental level is that the bodies 
created to advise the president have, for the last fourteen years, been shaped, at least in part, by 
the political ideology of the man occupying the Oval Office.  This indicates that studying 
presidential bioethics commissions will provide a better understanding of the complex 
relationship between fertility technology and the political process. 
The bioethics commissions are evidence of a recognition that public law, the 
constitutional mandates of the Supreme Court and criminalizing behavior through creating 
statutes, is not always the best fit.  The commissions do not make law, but instead conduct 
research into the efficacy of technologies, the value of the technologies to American society, and 
use this research to report to the President.  However, the commissions also point to that in 
addition to private law, there might also be room for some public law in the bioethics debate 
through administrative law.  In some situations, administrative regulation could potentially be a 
solution.  Ultimately some form of incremental change that is in line with, and receptive to, the 
values of the society the law governs is the best solution to dealing with issues that individuals 
desperately want the legal system to “fix.” 
Today, the field of bioethics is far reaching and encompasses a number of technologies 
and issues.  My dissertation will illustrate the drawbacks of using public law to resolve advances 
in biomedical technology, including: the inflexibility of the law to address nuanced changes in 
technology and shifts in public opinion, its susceptibility to political pressure, and its formulation 
by individuals who have little experience with medical technology.   
What kinds of issues do advances in fertility treatment create?  Some technologies offer 
comfort and predictability.  For example, genetic counseling helps couples determine if any 
genetic diseases could be passed to potential offspring.  While this reassures couples that their 
children will not likely suffer from a genetic disease, it produces ethical and moral questions.  If 
applied to traits or phenotypes rather then genetic diseases, the use of genetic counseling can 
push the boundaries of eugenics.  Generally, eugenics advocates the use of practices aimed at 
improving the genetic composition of the human population.   
Eugenics can be either positive or negative.  Positive eugenics is aimed at encouraging 
reproduction among the genetically advantaged, while negative eugenics is aimed at lowering 
fertility among the genetically disadvantaged.  The law has addressed the issue of eugenics in a 
number of cases.  Two classic examples are Buck v. Bell and Skinner v. Oklahoma.   
In the 1927 case of Buck v. Bell, the Supreme Court upheld a statute instituting 
compulsory sterilization of the unfit, including the mentally challenged, claiming an interest "for 
the protection and health of the state."  In this manner, the decision may be seen as an example of 
negative eugenics.  In Skinner v. Oklahoma, a 1942 Supreme Court ruling, the Court held that 
compulsory sterilization could not be imposed as a punishment for a crime.  Both cases illustrate 
how the law has already waded into the murky waters of eugenics and both cases demonstrate 
how using the law in the area of fertility can lead to undesirable results.   
Surrogacy, the practice of having a woman carry a child to term for another couple or 
parent, has changed and evolved over several decades.  In early examples, infertile couples 
would use the male partner’s sperm to fertilize an egg provided by the surrogate mother.  As the 
technology and procedure evolved, surrogate mothers could be implanted with a fertilized egg 
created by the infertile couple’s own gametes.  While clear standards in federal law or policy are 
largely absent from the debate surrounding surrogacy, state legislatures and courts have become 
involved in regulating the practice.  Moreover, similar to the early stages of development for in 
vitro fertilization, surrogacy regulation varies widely from state-to-state.  Some states, California 
for example, have permissive legislation allowing for the existence of surrogacy.  Other states, 
such as Indiana, declare that all cases of surrogacy agreements are against public policy and 
therefore unenforceable.  Still other states, such as Wisconsin, do not have any explicit 
legislation handling surrogacy.   
While the law governing surrogacy is diverse and varied, one court decision has 
preoccupied legal scholars and defined the overarching philosophical debate concerning the 
adjudication of surrogacy cases since it was announced.  The Supreme Court of New Jersey, in 
its 1988 decision In the Matter of Baby M, issued a widely regarded opinion considered 
fundamental in addressing the issue of surrogacy in the United States.  In the case of In the 
Matter of Baby M, we see the intersection of contract and family law, but more importantly the 
idea that some subject matter is not available for contract.  This case provides an excellent 
example of many of the issues involved in the practice of surrogacy: issues of class, issues of 
education, issues of public policy, liberty of contract, the emotional strain caused by infertility, 
and the psychological stress of a surrogate mother relinquishing a child. 
After being diagnosed with multiple sclerosis, Elizabeth Stern concluded that a 
pregnancy would not be in her best interest and might even jeopardize her health and life.  In 
order to create a family, Elizabeth Stern and her husband sought alternatives to starting a family.  
After rejecting the option to adopt, the Sterns, who were both well educated and financially 
secure, contacted the Infertility Center of New York.  The Center connected the Sterns with 
Mary Beth Whitehead, who after witnessing her sister struggle with infertility decided to help 
other infertile couples by becoming a surrogate mother.  The Sterns and Whitehead agreed to a 
surrogacy contract where Whitehead would carry the baby to full term and then turn over 
custody of the child to the Sterns.  The total value of the surrogacy contract was $22,100 - a sum 
that would greatly help the financially struggling Whiteheads.   
Mary Beth Whitehead gave birth to a baby girl in March of 1986.  Shortly thereafter, 
Mary Beth Whitehead, unwilling to give up the child, fled with the baby girl.  This story 
demonstrates how class and financial means factor into fertility treatment.  The Sterns would 
have never have had access to fertility treatment if they had not had the financial means to 
pursue a very expensive surrogacy contract. 
The issue of surrogacy agreements is often complicated further by the relationship of the 
prospective parents to the gametic material.  In Johnson v. Calvert, married couple Mark and 
Crispina Calvert were unable to have children following Crispina’s hysterectomy.  Anna 
Johnson, a coworker of Crispina, offered to act as a surrogate for the Calverts.  The Calverts and 
Anna Johnson subsequently entered into a surrogacy agreement.  The Calverts provided an 
embryo formed from their own gametes.  Under this arrangement, Anna Johnson did not provide 
an egg for fertilization.  Johnson was then implanted with the zygote generated from the 
Calvert’s gametes, which resulted in her pregnancy.  A child from this pregnancy was born on 
September 19, 1990.  Following the delivery of the child, Anna Johnson refused to relinquish 
custody.  The California courts were now presented with the complicated issue of two different 
women claiming maternity.  Crispina Calvert was the genetic mother of the newly born child.  
Anna Johnson, however, carried the child to term and delivered the baby - a gestational mother.  
Under these circumstances, the court determined that the genetic mother was considered the 
natural mother under California law.  The court held: 
[w]e conclude that although the Act3 recognizes both genetic consanguinity and giving 
birth as means of establishing a mother and child relationship, when the two means do 
not coincide in one woman, she who intended to procreate the child—that is, she who 
intended to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her own—is the 
natural mother under California law.4   
 
Under this interpretation, the Court focuses on the intent of parties – utilizing principles of 
contract law. 
Moreover, the majority opinion in Johnson v. Calvert opening rejected critics arguments 
that surrogacy was degrading, dehumanizing women and exploiting differences in economic 
status inherent in issues of class to take advantage of women of lower economic means.  The 
court stated,   
The argument that a woman cannot knowingly and intelligently agree to gestate and 
deliver a baby for intending parents carries overtones of the reasoning that for centuries 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  “Act”	  refers	  to	  the	  California	  Uniform	  Parentage	  Act	  4	  Johnson	  v.	  Calvert,	  851	  P.2d	  776	  (Cal.	  1993)	  
prevented women from attaining equal economic rights and professional status under the 
law.  To resurrect this view is both to foreclose personal and economic choice on the part 
of the surrogate mother, and to deny intending parents what may be their only means of 
procreating a child of their own genes.5 
 
With this holding, the Court affirms principles essential to contract law: examining the intent of 
the parties involved.  Moreover, the court employed other principles found in common law 
decisions, such as contract and tort, in this case.  The above-referenced quotation illustrates how 
the court recognized the agency of the parties.  In addition, the majority opinion explicitly 
addresses the ability of Anna Johnson to enter into contractual arrangements.  Her education and 
intellectual ability present no bars to believing she was able and capable of exercising informed 
consent when entering into the surrogacy agreement with the Calverts.  The Calvert case 
provides an excellent opportunity to examine issues of class and education and how they speak 
to the development of policy and the application of law in fertility cases.  Issues of class and 
education are also present in the Baby M case.  Comparing these two cases will be useful in 
explaining the consequences of legal solutions in biomedical advance. 
Roger Dworkin, a bioethics scholar and law professor emeritus suggests that the law is 
important and can and should be used as a valuable tool to resolve disagreements in the field of 
bioethics.  However, he also cautions that “blind faith in the law’s ability to resolve bioethical 
problems or unthinking acquiescence in the dominant role of law would be … unsound.”  
Dworkin argues that law is a limiting or reactive factor, rather than a positively acting, forward-
looking force, and as a limiting factor, law should only be used when imposing limits.6  
In summation, private law rather than public law, particularly the areas of contract and 
tort, is in some instances better equipped to resolve the diverse and complicated issues presented 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Johnson	  v.	  Calvert,	  851	  P.2d	  776	  (Cal.	  1993)	  6	  Roger B. Dworkin, Limits: The Role of the Law in Bioethical Decision Making (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1996), 2.	  
by advances in biomedical technology – principally in the area of fertility treatment.   Moreover, 
the historical record substantiates that solutions applied by legislatures or constitutional 
interpretation often fail to permit the flexibility required to effectively balance the competing 
interests inherent in the rapid changes associated with biomedical research.   In this way, the law 
and the legal system should tread gently, walking up to the water’s edge, wading into this 
immense reservoir of moral uncertainty, careful not to allow the water to overpower and engulf 
us.  
